Top US military delegation arrives in Burma

A 22-member delegation of senior US military officials have arrived in Burma to engage top military officials there on working more closely with the US.

Observers said the purpose of the trip was also to try to move the Burmese military to strongly support democratic reforms and peacemaking efforts in ethnic regions.

The delegation includes Lt. Gen Francis Wiercinski, the head of the US Army’s Pacific command, and the visit reflected the

US Army Pacific Commander Lt. Gen. Francis Wiercinski speaks
at the opening ceremony of the 36th Annual Pacific Armies
Management Seminar in Canberra, Australia, 
on July 16, 2012. Photo: U.S. Army

growing view in Washington that the support of Burma’s military is essential to any lasting reforms or peace agreements with ethnic minorities, according to a story on the Financial Times website on Monday.

Recently, Burma asked Thailand to help secure US support for its participation in US-Thai Cobra Gold joint military exercises.

Other delegation officials include Vikram Singh, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, Derek Mitchell, the US ambassador to Burma, and other senior officials from the state department, National Security Council, homeland security department and USAid.

They are due to meet Burma’s President Thein Sein and Min Aung Hlaing, the commander-in-chief of the military, and other senior officials.

Besides government officials, the delegation will meet leaders of ethnic groups including Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists from the western coastal state of Rakhine (formerly Arakan).

They will also meet trade unions and religious groups, as well as members of Aung SanSuu Kyi’s National League for Democracy and Generation ‘88, a group of former political prisoners.

In a recent report, the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies suggested that the US should start bilateral programmes of training and exchange visits as a precursor to normalizing military relations.

 “This visit makes perfect sense,” said Thant Myint-U, who is involved in the government’s peace efforts, told The Financial Times. “It would be counterproductive for the peace process to proceed without involving Myanmar’s military.”

Meanwhile, US Deputy Secretary of State William Burns is also visiting Burma to consult with officials. 

Myanmar's President Thein Sein has blocked the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC) from opening an office for Rohingya Muslims

President Thein Sein will not allow the opening of an office in the country "because it is not in accordance with the people's desires," said an official from the president’s office on Monday.


Ten Sein made the decision after thousands of monks took to the streets in several cities to protest against his willingness to help Rohingya Muslims in the crisis-stricken Rakhine state in the west.
Shouting and holding banners reading "No OIC", the protesters said they would not accept any OIC office in the country.

Rohingya Muslims are currently under a brutal siege by the extremist Buddhists in the areas of the state capital Sittwe as well as the city of Maungdaw in the Rakhine state, according to recent reports.

Reports also say some 650 Rohingyas have been killed in the Rakhine state in the recent months. This is while 1,200 others are missing and some 80,000 more have been displaced.

The Buddhist-majority government of Myanmar refuses to recognize Rohingyas and has classified them as illegal migrants, even though they are said to be Muslim descendants of Persian, Turkish, Bengali, and Pathan origin, who migrated to Myanmar as early as the 8th century.

According to reports, thousands of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims are living in dire conditions in refugee camps after government forces and Buddhist extremists started burning down their villages on August 10.

The UN human rights authorities blame Myanmar’s security forces for the violence, who are believed to have been targeting the Muslims rather than bringing the ethnic violence to an end in the country.

Rohingya refugees face more restrictions

Activists warn of further restrictions on Rohingya refugees in southeastern Bangladesh following recent communal violence.
“Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh will likely face more restrictions on their movement or arrests and push-backs,” Chris Lewa, director of the Arakan Project, an advocacy organisation for the Rohingya, told IRIN yesterday.
“We are seeing examples of that already on the ground.”
“Refugees International is concerned about the talk of further restrictions being imposed on Rohingya refugees in the Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh,” said Melanie Teff, a senior advocate with Refugees International.
The Rohingya - an ethnic, linguistic and religious minority who fled persecution en masse from Myanmar’s neighbouring Rakhine state decades ago - have long had a tenuous relationship with the Bangladeshi authorities who view them as illegal
migrants.
Under Burmese law, they are de jure stateless and face constant persecution, say activists, while in Bangladesh they are barred from employment.
According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), there are more than 200,000 Rohingya in Bangladesh today, including more than 30,000 documented refugees living in two government-run camps (Kutupalong and Nayapara) within 2km of the Burmese border.
UNHCR has not been permitted to register newly arriving Rohingya since mid-1992. The vast majority of Rohingya are living in villages and towns in the area and receive little to no assistance as UNHCR is only allowed to assist those who are documented.
On 1 October, Bangladesh Home Minister Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir accused the Rohingya of involvement in a series of attacks on minority Buddhist temples and homes in the southeast.
The violence was reportedly triggered by a photo posted on Facebook that insulted Islam at the end of September, resulting in some of the worst sectarian violence in Bangladesh in years.
Thousands of Muslims went on the rampage in predominately Buddhist areas, setting ablaze temples and monasteries, resulting in dozens of homes burned.
“The attacks on temples and houses in Buddhist localities in Ramu and neighbouring areas in Cox’s Bazar (district) were perpetrated by radical Islamists,” the minister told reporters.
“Rohingyas and political opponents of the government were also involved in the attack,” he added, describing the incident as a “premeditated and deliberate attempt” to disrupt
communal harmony.
Recent violence in Rakhine State has displaced thousands.
Following the violence, law enforcement agencies were instructed to restrict the movement of Rohingya refugees and curb their interactions with the local community - a move confirmed by refugees on the ground.
“New check posts were established and we are facing abnormal restriction after the Ramu incident,” a 20-year-old Rohingya youth, who asked not to be identified, told IRIN by phone.
The impact of these events in Myanmar is also a concern. “What’s happening in Bangladesh will only exacerbate communal tension inside Rakhine state,” Lewa said.
In June 2012 violence flared in Rakhine State forcing tens of thousands of Rohingya to flee both within Myanmar and across the border.
According to Myanmar government estimates, more than 70,000 people are now living in temporary camps and shelters following inter-communal
conflict.
Of particular concern is forced segregation and protracted displacement in the state capital, Sittwe, where Rohingya who lost their homes in the violence have been moved into camps, says Refugees International.
Despite repeated advocacy efforts by UNHCR, civil society and the diplomatic community, Bangladesh decided to close its borders to persons fleeing the country.
Those who managed to make it to Bangladesh were rounded up and sent back. However, there are no reliable figures on the number of arrivals and the number refouled.
Bangladesh is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. IRIN

Stateless in Burma: Rohingya word wars

In order to understand how the ‘Rohingya crisis’ has come to pass we need to consider the narrative built by three groupings of international actors – the Burmese government, host countries for Rohingya who have fled and the international community at large.
‘Rohingya crisis’ is a much bandied phrase these days. Since June this year, arbitrary arrests, disappearances, burnings, beatings, rapes, killings and other forms of persecution against this most marginalised group have led to human rights and humanitarian crises which have tainted the landscape of Rakhine State in Western Burma and given substance to the term. In order to understand how these developments have come to pass, we need to consider the narrative built around the crisis by three groupings of international actors – the Burmese government, host countries for Rohingya who have fled and the international community at large. Amidst the jockeying for position in the discourse – and opportunities to define it – the human impact of the crisis appears to have been relegated to the background. As a result, it seems that we are no closer to a solution that is just and equitable and that respects the human rights of the Rohingya.
In the context of the Rohingya crisis, the international community at large comprises two main interest groups – the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and what can loosely be termed as the western block (the EU, US and Australia etc.). These countries have varying degrees of interest in the Rohingya issue specifically and conflicting economic and geo-political interests in Burma more widely. According to their narratives, the Rohingya are clear victims both within Burma and (to a lesser extent) in the countries to which they flee. A sub-text to the western block version of this narrative is that the Burmese democratic transition process is also suffering because of this and other ‘communal conflicts’ in Burma.
According to the narrative of Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand and other countries which host large numbers of Rohingya refugees, the ‘crisis’ endures because of the lack of straightforward solutions to the problem. Burma is responsible, but the Rohingya are both victim (inside Burma) and burden (in their own countries). It must be noted that Bangladesh and Malaysia are also member states of the OIC.
Burma views the crisis as one caused by the existence of these unwanted people and their encroachment into its territory.

The Burmese Narrative – The Illegal, Unwanted Migrant Bengali

Let’s begin with the most repellent narrative – the Rohingya are illegal immigrants; land stealing encroachers; criminals who procreate like rabbits; dark skinned and ugly. In this view they certainly do not belong in Burma. In fact, this narrative posits that the term ‘Rohingya’ is a fiction – they are all ‘Bengali’. This racist, totally unfounded and hate-inciting position is that of the Burmese regime. It is a narrative that is shared by many Burmese, including leaders of the democratic movement and those who have never seen a Rohingya in their lives. Dating back decades, it has been used to justify acute discrimination, exclusion, abuse and violence against the Rohingya. The power of this narrative is such that in 1982 it was the basis upon which the Rohingya were stripped of their nationality. They were thus rendered stateless, which means that they are not considered as nationals by any State under the operation of its law.
The main arena within which this narrative has played out is within Burma and amongst diaspora groups. However, the regime has not shied away from making formal statements along these lines internationally: at gatherings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), amongst diplomats and to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. No doubt, words spoken internationally have domestic audiences in mind, but they probably also stem from an understanding that the ‘new’ Burma cannot continue to operate with the impunity and isolation of the old; that it needs to engage with and attempt to win over non-Burmese actors, or in the very least, make a strong case as to why it will not succumb to international pressure.
Contested histories are an extremely potent tool for those who engage in the business of lies – they shift focus from the present to the past and divert attention from the core issues. The Burmese regime has expertly negotiated the situation, playing Rakhine (the Buddhist majority population of Rakhine State) against Rohingya, drawing on absurd historical accounts and creating a Rohingya ‘fiction’ which they have used to justify their unjustifiable laws, policies and actions. Over time these laws, policies and actions have imposed a new reality on Rakhine state in which exclusion, discrimination and arbitrariness have become the norm; marriage without bribery-induced permission is a crime; forced migration is the most common type of movement and return to Burma is illegal. The untrue narrative of ‘illegal migrant’ has taken on a truth of its own as those who commit the crime of fleeing persecution cannot legally return. In 1978, about 200,000 Rohingya who fled the country and were forcibly returned thus substantiated the ‘illegal immigrant’ narrative. Similar numbers ‘illegally migrated’ out of and back into Burma in the 1990s.
Rohingya names are also being struck off ‘family lists’ – often the only type of documentation for Rohingya and consequently the only proof that they were born in Burma. After the violence erupted in June 2012, security personnel have reportedly been visiting Rohingya homes and striking off the family list the names of persons not present at the time. They may have gone to the shops, been in hiding or been ‘disappeared’ by those very security forces or fled to Bangladesh. Whatever the reason, their absence from home renders them ‘illegal’.
Over time, and perhaps because of international pressure, this narrative has become more nuanced. The Burmese President has in some forums admitted that illegal migration is minimal and that the real problem is the Rohingya population explosion. This shift in discourse adds another layer of complexity and confusion to the narrative, particularly because it hasn’t replaced the ‘illegal immigrant’ argument, but rather formed a parallel track. Both versions (they are illegal immigrants and they multiply too aggressively) stem from the xenophobic position that the Rohingya are foreign invaders taking over Burmese lands.
The narrative does not end there. It goes on to absolve the regime of any responsibility. The fact that the Rohingya are ‘illegal immigrants’ is meant to explain why they are hated by the rest of Burma, and particularly by the Rakhine whose lands they have encroached on. This, it is posited, has driven the local ‘legal’ population to violence – and understandably so. Accordingly, the Burmese regime does not endorse the violence but, in the face of such strong sentiment, it has been powerless to prevent it from happening.
The contradictions are plentiful: Burma blocks humanitarian aid being received by those most in need; Burmese security personnel have played an active role in the violence and other crimes committed; and any contention that this all-powerful regime that yesterday ruled with an iron fist is today unable to control civilians acting on their own accord is simply laughable.

The Host Country Narrative – The Burdensome, Economic Migrant Rohingya

Bangladesh is the primary proponent of the host country narrative which Malaysia, Thailand and other countries also buy into. It holds that the Rohingya are both victim and opportunist and always a burden and a security threat. This narrative recognises that the Rohingya face discrimination – even persecution inside Burma, but also labels those who have fled persecution as opportunistic economic migrants who impose undue pressures on job markets and social structures. This is a narrative of convenience which empathises with the suffering of the Rohingya as long as they remain inside Burma but vilifies those very same Rohingya who seek refuge on their shores. Its contradictions have led to confused and conflicting attitudes and policies. In Bangladesh, a small number (less than 30,000) of Rohingya are recognised as refugees, a much larger group (over 300,000) who share the same characteristics are viewed as economic migrants. Both groups are seen as burdens to already stretched state resources and as threats to national security. In Malaysia, the UNHCR is allowed to register the Rohingya but not to protect them as refugees.


This dichotomous portrayal of the Rohingya as both victim and problem creates a situation where they are refused the protection that common sense and international law say they deserve. It also leads to situations that justify the deliberate violation of human rights through aggressive, life-threatening acts. Bangladesh pushed back to sea boatloads of Rohingya refugees in the aftermath of the June violence, their justification being that they could not bear the Rohingya burden alone any longer. Their refusal to accept multi-million dollar infrastructure support for Rohingya, their refusal to accept third country offers to resettle small numbers of Rohingya and their withdrawing of permission to three key humanitarian agencies to continue supporting the Rohingya indicate that Bangladesh is the primary reason that Bangladesh bears this burden alone. Another contradiction. Another case of reality being manipulated to fit self-serving narratives. Bangladesh is not the only culprit. Thailand too pushed back hundreds of Rohingya to sea in 2009/2010, due to the ‘security threat’ they supposedly posed.
The countries that espouse this narrative acknowledge that there is a problem but are engaged in a stalemate with regard to solutions. Each is unwilling to act first, for fear of attracting still more Rohingya. They call for a ‘holistic’ or ‘regional’ solution – different ways of saying that Burma must right its wrongs and accept all Rohingya back – even those who have lived their entire lives in these third countries.

The International Community Narrative – The Victim Rohingya

Other countries, particularly those that do not have to deal with large numbers of Rohingya arriving unannounced on their shores, acknowledge that the Rohingya are victimised by Burma and also that receiving countries fall short of their protection obligations. This narrative seemingly says the right things, but is not loud, forceful or timely.
Why is this so? One reason may be awareness – particularly on the part of western countries – that they would be seen or portrayed as meddling in the affairs of the global south. A second reason may be reluctance to step in and share responsibility. Shouting ‘victim’ too loudly would obligate actions under international human rights law and the doctrine of responsibility to protect. Perhaps, this sort of burden sharing which goes beyond tokenistic gestures is not high on the foreign policy agendas of the powers that be. Much stronger forces are also at play: geo-political and economic strategies vis-a-vis China which have dominated the Burmese economic landscape since the sanctions-era. Burma, with all its stuttering promise of democratisation, is opening up to the rest of the world – a world suffering the impact of economic crisis upon crisis, desperate for new resources, markets and spheres of influence. And so the contradictory and dishonest Burmese narrative is pandered to, sanctions are lifted and international obligations to step in to protect the most vulnerable are forgotten.
Thus, the victim Rohingya makes her way into reports and statements and is the subject of conferences and resolutions. But food isn’t put onto her table, she is not protected from rape and she continues to be persecuted by Burma, shunned by Bangladesh and exploited by Malaysia.
The victim narrative has been reduced to words that bear little meaning because they have not been backed up with deeds.

The Human Rights Position – The Stateless, Refugee, Discriminated Rohingya

The above analysis demonstrates that ultimately the Rohingya are in the same place they were at the beginning of the story. They continue to be persecuted and excluded, to be misrepresented and unwelcome and to lack any form of control over their own destinies. Perhaps there has been one change in that, with increasing international interest, the Rohingya have found new influential ‘friends’. However, this has not yet translated into a difference actually being made, predominantly because these ‘friends’ are not primarily influenced by what is morally right or legally obligatory, but rather by what makes economic and geo-political sense.
But this cannot and must not be so. Not in the 21st century. Not in a world of human rights, where it is the duty of the international community to protect the most vulnerable. ‘Statelessness’ is the ultimate test of the effectiveness of international human rights law. The stateless are the only truly direct subjects of the law, for they do not additionally benefit from national protection. And the Rohingya are the most vulnerable of all the world’s stateless persons.
Human rights principles challenge us to act not out of self-interest, but out of a legal obligation to protect the most vulnerable. Importantly, this obligation arises not from a sense of charity, but from an understanding that by protecting the most vulnerable and creating the space for them to partake in society as equals we strengthen democracy, stabilise the economy and increase security.
Amal de Chickera would like to give special thanks to Natalie Brinham for her extensive feedback and input in the creation of this article.

Rohingya crisis’ has come to pass word wars

‘Rohingya crisis’ is a much bandied phrase these days. Since June this year, arbitrary arrests, disappearances, burnings, beatings, rapes, killings and other forms of persecution against this most marginalised group have led to human rights and humanitarian crises which have tainted the landscape of Rakhine State in Western Burma and given substance to the term. In order to understand how these developments have come to pass, we need to consider the narrative built around the crisis by three groupings of international actors – the Burmese government, host countries for Rohingya who have fled and the international community at large. Amidst the jockeying for position in the discourse – and opportunities to define it – the human impact of the crisis appears to have been relegated to the background. As a result, it seems that we are no closer to a solution that is just and equitable and that respects the human rights of the Rohingya.
In the context of the Rohingya crisis, the international community at large comprises two main interest groups – the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and what can loosely be termed as the western block (the EU, US and Australia etc.). These countries have varying degrees of interest in the Rohingya issue specifically and conflicting economic and geo-political interests in Burma more widely. According to their narratives, the Rohingya are clear victims both within Burma and (to a lesser extent) in the countries to which they flee. A sub-text to the western block version of this narrative is that the Burmese democratic transition process is also suffering because of this and other ‘communal conflicts’ in Burma.
According to the narrative of Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand and other countries which host large numbers of Rohingya refugees, the ‘crisis’ endures because of the lack of straightforward solutions to the problem. Burma is responsible, but the Rohingya are both victim (inside Burma) and burden (in their own countries). It must be noted that Bangladesh and Malaysia are also member states of the OIC.
Burma views the crisis as one caused by the existence of these unwanted people and their encroachment into its territory.

Burmese hold many expectations for Aung San Suu Kyi as she visits Southern California

Three hours before the scheduled start of Suu Kyi’s visit, Burmese Americans started lining up inside the LA Convention Center – the same place in which many of them became naturalized US citizens over the years.
"We are waiting for this day," said Zin Mar Htun. She stood at the front of the line wearing an embroidered turquoise dress and orchids in her hair. She and her family arrived as political refugees in the mid-1990s. Her father was involved in Burma’s pro-democracy movement, and they haven’t been able to return since they left.

Photo of : Burmese residents of Southern California line up outside the LA Convention Center a few hours before the arrival of Aung San Suu Kyi.

“I know America is great, but we still need to go back and help our country, because our country is very underdeveloped," said Htun. "Mainly I want to help with education so I do want to go back. If they open up, then it will be better—right now, we’re still scared to go back in case something goes wrong.”
For many younger Burmese-Americans like Htun, who’s in her late 20s, Suu Kyi’s visit to this country suggests the promise of a truly democratic Burma, and an opportunity to return someday.
After almost two decades of house arrest and her election to her country’s parliament this spring, Suu Kyi enjoys an international status similar to that of South Africa’s Nelson Mandela shortly after his release from prison. During her US visit, she’s made a point to reach out to the Burmese diaspora – the better to improve US-Burma relations and trigger economic development back home.
Some critics maintain that she has made too many political compromises with Burma’s current government; it includes many of the military leaders who kept her under house arrest. But Lal Thanga, a dentist by trade and one of the organizers of Suu Kyi’s visit here, said those criticisms aren’t completely fair.
“Some people might criticize and say she can’t speak up anymore," Thanga said. "But, to me, this is part of the democratic process. She has to deal with a lot of things that we don’t know; we don’t know the hardships she’s going through. If we don’t support her, what can she do? So we have to keep on supporting her.”
About 100,000 people of Burmese descent live in the United States. The biggest concentration – close to 5,000 – are in the Los Angeles area. Some of these refugees and immigrants belong to ethnic minorities that have been persecuted since the 1970s. Groups including the Rohingya, Keren, and Kachin do not qualify for Burmese citizenship under current law.
“Ms. Suu Kyi should focus on the human rights first, then we can talk about cooperating with Mr.Thein Sein, Burma’s current president," said Ko Ko Naing, a 26 year old from the Rohingya Muslim minority who obtained political asylum in this country nine years ago, sitting at a cafe near the LA Convention Center.
Naing peacefully opposes Suu Kyi’s visit, he said, because he wants people to know that not all is well in Burma. The West, he added, earnestly supports Suu Kyi’s party, the National League of Democracy, and seems eager for a democratic transition as it overlooks the needs of the wider Burmese population.
“She’s ignoring all the ethnic minorities," he said. "She’s only focusing on the political prisoners that have been fighting with the NLD members. She’s ignoring the core issues of all the ethnic minorities, their education needs, their basic food needs, their shelter needs.”
When Suu Kyi showed up exactly on time for her presentation, a couple of thousand cheering Burmese welcomed her waving the red flags of her political party. She fielded questions from the audience in Burmese, except for one in English: ‘What would you do if you became president?’ That’s too speculative, she responded, adding, ‘why don’t you ask the president what he will do, now that he’s president?’

Rakhine terrorists are starting to kill Rohingyas in Akyab

Rakhine terrorists including Rakhine monks, Rakhine paramilitaries and Rakhine polices have surrounded the Rohingyas in Maulik and Kasit of Akyab downtown since the evening. Rohingyas from the Maulik, run to Kasit Ywa where Rohingya majority live. Htin Linn, Minister of Border Affairs of Arakan said that there no enough militaries to protect Rohingyas from the big amount of Rakhine terrorists. It is crystal clear that Myanmar Central Government’s administration doesn’t enforce over the Rakhine State and Rakhine terrorists. Rakhine-Rohingya violence is not incident. It is a systematic preplanned ethnic cleansing. International Communities failed to protect the world’s most persecuted community, Rohingya.

Is Rakhine State Administration separated from Myanmar Central Administration?

On 12^th October, 2012, at 8:30pm (Myanmar Standard Time), uncountable Rakhine extremists and monks are surrounding the Aung Mingla quarter, where the majority of the residents are Rohingyas, in Sittway downtown. Although military troops are trying their best in order to control the extremist, the condition is extraordinarily in tense. The extremists are so serious that they even do not heed to the military troops. According to the imposed Act-144, not more than 5 people can gather in a place. Now (in the time of reporting) uncountable Rakhine extremist and monks are gathering to attack the Rohingya community in Sittway. It clearly shows that the Rakhine State administration is totally not following the instructions of the Central Administration. It can be concluded that the Rakhine State is already separated from Union of Myanmar in administrative issues. As of 12^th October, 2012, Union of Myanmar is of Seven Regions and 6 States remaining in administration. Up to 10:15pm (MST), the extremists are trying to attack the Rohingyas in the deeply dark night. No one can expect whether the Rohingyas from the said village will see the morning of tomorrow or not.